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CONSTITU'TIONAL LAW-CIVI RIGHTS-KANGAROO CoURT-[Federal].-
The sheriff of Crittenden County, Arkansas, two of his deputies, a state
highway patrolman, a practicing lawyer of the county, and an inmate of
the county jail formed a conspiracy to cause the arrest of innocent indi-
viduals for the purpose of extorting them. These persons (referred to by
the court as "victims") would be severely beaten, prevented from com-
municating with people outside the county jail, abused in a cruel "kangaroo
court,"' and forced to employ the attorney who was party to the con-
spiracy. Arrest and imprisonment would then follow based on trumped-up
charges filed by fellow-conspirators; and huge sums of money were ex-
torted from these victims upon promise of release which sums were in turn
distributed among the conspirators. Those conspirators who were law en-
forcement officers were charged with the violation of Section 202 of the
United States Criminal Code which makes it a crime for officials, acting
under color of law, to subject an inhabitant of a state "to the deprivation
of his rights, privileges, or immunities." The lawyer and the convict who
were not law enforcement officers and could not therefore be found guilty
of violating Section 20 were indicted by a Federal grand under Section
373 of the U. S. Criminal Code for having conspired to commit an offense
against the United States by aiding and abetting the officers indicted under
Section 20. Two defendants were acquitted, one died before the trial, and
the three appellants were convicted by a jury verdict after their demurrer
to the indictment was overruled. Held: Judgment affirmed. The defendants
were guilty of the offenses charged in the indictments as, under color of the
law that created their offices, they did conspire to deprive inhabitants of
the state of Arkansas of rights, privileges and immunities secured and pro-
tected by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Culp v. United
Statos.4
There are two principal federal statutes that protect the civil rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. The first of these is Section 195 of the
1. See Ballentine's Law Dictionary (1930) 717: Kangaroo court-"a
mock court composed of fellow prisoners of one confined in a jail or prison,
by which he is tried for assault or other offenses alleged to have been com-
mitted by him against them or any of them." See 2 R. C. L. 1184.
2. (1909) 35 Stat. 1092, c. 321, 18 U. S. C. A. 52. "Whoever, under
color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully sub-jects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or
District to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different
punishments, pains or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an
alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punish-
ment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both."
3. (1909) 35 Stat. 1096, c. 321 §37, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 88. "If two or
more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose,
and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each of the parties shall be fined not more than $10,000, or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
4. (C. C. A. 8, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 93.
5. (1909) 35 Stat. 1092, c. 321, 18 U. S. C. A. 51. "If two or more
persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in
the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by
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United States Criminal Code which provides for the punishment of indi-
viduals who conspire to prevent any United States citizen from exercising
the rights that are protected by the Constitution and laws thereunder.
This statute was primarily intended to outlaw the Klan-like activities that
were so common after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
statute has not been held applicable to actions against individuals as con-
trasted actions against states because of its dependency on the Fourteenth
Amendment, and all such actions have been successfully demurred to. The
second federal statute concerned with the protection of the civil rights of
individuals is Section 20 of the U. S. Criminal Code. The provisions of
Section 206 prescribe the punishment for anyone who acting under color
of law subjects any inhabitant of a state of the United States to the
deprivation of his constitutionally-guaranteed rights or to punishments,
pains, or penalties because of such person's alienage, color, or race.
The constitutional basis of both sections is the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution. The derivation7 of the statutory provisions is found in
Section 5 of the amendment itself which provides:
"The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article."
The guarantee of fundamental rights by the Fourteenth Amendment does
not operate against encroachments by individuals;8 but, if the individual
who deprives another of any right, privilege, or immunity acts in an official
capacity either de jure or de facto in the clothing of the law, the guarantee
is applicable.
Relatively little case law has been developed regarding Section 20. Prior
to the instant case only five successful prosecutions resulted under the
statute. The precise meaning of the section was clouded by judicial con-
fusion as to its provisions in the early cases. The early decisions did not
carefully analyze the provisions of the statute that outline the two offenses
defined by it. In the case of United States v. Buntin9 a teacher of a rural
school was convicted under Section 20 for depriving Negro children of
their right to attend school when, acting under color of the law that
authorized his position, he excluded them from the rolls of the public
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so
exercised the same, or, if two or more persons go in disguise on the high-
way, or on the premises of another with intent to prevent or hinder' his
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall
be fined not more than ;5,000, or imprisoned not more than ten years, and
shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor,
profit, or trust created by the Constitution or the laws of the United
States."
6. See note 2, supra.
7. But see Victor W. Rotnem, The Federal Civil Right Not To Be
Lynched (1943) 28 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY 57, 64.
8. United States v. Cruikshank (1876) 92 U. S. 542, 554 "It simply
furnishes an additional guarantee against any encroachment by the States
upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of
society."
9. United States v. Buntin (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1882) 10 Fed. 730.
1943]
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schools. The second case on this point, United States v. Stone,lo resulted
in the conviction of two election officials who, under color of office, refused
to honor the ballots of certain Negro voters; it was held that they deprived
citizens of the right to vote on account of their color. These decisions failed
to distinguish between convictions that could be held under part of Section
20 dealing with the guarantee of fundamental rights and convictions for
enforcing illegMl punishments because of race, color or alienage.
Under this statute are found two offenses: the first is the wilful depriva-
tion of the fundamental rights guaranteed by constitutional provisions; the
second is the administration of punishments, pains, and penalties on cer-
tain' persons because of alienage, color, or race different from those penal-
ties prescribed for citizens. The judges in the Buntin case and the Stone
case applied the language concerning race, color, and alienage to the first
as well as to the second offense under Section 20. In his opinion in United
States v. Classic,"' Justice Stone sets forth the distinctions between the
offenses and interprets the language in question as applicable to the act of
forcing extra-legal punishments and pains, not to the deprivation of rights.
This distinction is of great importance in using the statute to preserve civil
liberties because, by limiting the phrases relating to race, color, and alien-
age to the second offense, the courts may uphold indictments against indi-
viduals who persecute others whether because of race, color, or alienage
or not if these persons are deprived of their civil rights. Thus, in the
present case, the demurrer to the indictment was properly overruled al-
though nothing pertinent to race, color, or alienage was alleged.
From 1911 until 1940 no cases relative to Section 20 were reported al-
though there grew up a wealth of case law about Section 19. The reason
for this is the number of prosecutions that resulted from the lynching
activities that Section 19 was intended to outlaw. Indictments were not
issued under Section 20 because of the requirement that the defendant's
actions must have been cloaked in the color of law.1 2 In the overwhelming
majority of cases state or municipal officers or others acting under color
of law either did not participate in the lynchings or could not be held at
the time of arrests.
The determining factor in the prosecutions under Section 20 is the defini-
tion of the phrase "under color of law." Two courts have recently defined
these words. In the opinion of the Classic case it is stated, " .... Misuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken
'under color of' state law." Another definition of the phrase is found in
United States v. Sutherland.- Here a policeman was indicted and con-
10. United States v. Stone (D. C. D. M. D. 1911) 188 Fed. 836.
11. (1941) 313 U. S. 299.
12. See United States v. Ellis (D. C. W. D. S. C. 1942) 43 Fed. Supp.
321 for distinction between the acts of public officials and private indi-
viduals.'
13. (D. C. N. D. Ga. 1940) 37 F. Supp. 344. For a discussion of the
words "state action" also see Ex Parte Virginia (1879) 100 U. S. 399;
Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles (1913) 227 U. S. 278;
Hague v. C. I. 0. (1939) 307 U. S. 496.
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victed under Section 20 for torturing a colored boy with a hot iron into
making a confession. His demurrer to the indictment was overruled on the
grounds that he had acted under authority of the state law that created the
position of policeman and prescribed its duties. Therefore, the demurrer
in the Culp case to the indictments against the sheriff, his deputies, and
the highway patrolman was properly overruled; for these men did de-
prive persons of the right to be granted due process of law acting under
the laws of Arkansas that authorized their jobs.
In regard to the defendants who did not act under color of law, that is,
the lawyer and the convict, the court said that, although they alone could
not be charged under Section 20 which is limited to defendants who act
in any official capacity, by agreeing with the conspirators and furthering
the conspiracy, these defendants can be held under Section 37.14
The decision in the Culp case is in accord with the interpretation of Sec-
tion 20 since the Classic case and a subsequent case, Catlette V. United
States,'5 corroborates this theory. The Catlette case arose when a deputy
sheriff and others clothed in color of office refused police protection to
citizens of West Virginia and wrongfully detained them and subjected them
to unspeakable humiliation and cruelty as a persuasion to leave the munici-
pality, and it resulted in convictions after a demurrer to the indictment
was overruled.
Cases under Section 20 are rather few; but, since the clarification of
the confusion that surrounded its interpretation prior to the Classic case,
the statute's importance as a practical method of guaranteeing civil rights
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States has increased;
yet it can be over-emphasized. As Victor W. Rotnem pointed out in a
recent article for the Bill of Rights Review, "It must be remembered, how-
ever, that this inertia is due, in no small part, to two rules of law which
are themselves safeguards of the liberty of individuals."16 Firstly,'2
criminal statutes must be strictly construed. Secondly, the government has
a limited right of appeal from adverse results in criminal cases; the safe-
guard against double jeopardy found in the Bill of Rights being the source
of limitation." B. G.
ExECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-INvENTORY-DISTRIBUTION UNDER MU-
TUAL AGREEMENT OF THE HEns--[Missouri].-The intestate left eight en-
velopes, each containing notes or other property, in his safety deposit box.
Each envelope was labeled with the name of one of his eight heirs. At the
time the inventory was made the heirs met with the administrator and
each took the envelope bearing his respective name, and all executed a
written waiver of claim to the contents of the envelopes. The contents of
14. Coffin v. United States (1896) 162 U. S. 664; United States v.
Rabinowich (1915) 238 U. S. 78; Carter v. United States (C. C. A., 1927)
19 F. (2d) 431; Curtis v. United States (C. C. A. 10, 1933) 67 F. (2d) 943.
15. (C. C. A. 4, 1943) 132 F. (2d) 902.
16. Clarification of the Civil Rights Statutes (1942) 2 Bill of Rights
Review 252, 261.
17. McBoyle v. United States (1931) 283 U. S. 25.
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